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hile the geopolitics of the Ukraine crisis have dominated headlines, little attention 
has been paid to the potential challenges arising from the movement of people 
from the region to the EU. Yet recent history should tell us this could be a grave 
oversight. As we witnessed during the Arab Spring in 2011, political upheaval can result in 
people fleeing their state in fear of persecution or seeking to leave their state in search of new 
horizons and economic opportunities. The EU would do well to learn from the Arab Spring 
experience and the policy failures that resulted from the Union’s response of closing its 
borders and returning people to Africa (Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin, 2012). It is critical 
that – independently of the still uncertain outcome of the Ukraine crisis – the EU formulates 
and implements a credible policy strategy addressing the potential impact and benefits of 
mobility between Ukraine and the EU. 
We hope that the situation in Ukraine will not develop into one giving rise to a need for 
international protection of people. In such a case, the EU and its member states would be 
evidently required to respect their commitments to provide safe harbour to refugees. 
Nevertheless upheaval always comes with an economic cost and Ukraine could face a long 
economic downturn. Available statistics indicate that Ukraine is already an important 
migration source country for the Union. According to Eurostat data, about 635,000 Ukrainian 
nationals resided in the EU in 2012.1 Ukrainian citizens applied for more Schengen visas 
                                                 
1  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/infographics/immigration/migration-in-eu-
infographic_en.pdf About 40,000 residence permits were issued during 2012 to Ukrainian nationals, 
only preceded by nationals of the US, India, China and Morocco (see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/e-library/docs/infographics/ha-in-numbers/home_affairs_in_numbers_en.pdf). See also the 
statistical data on residence permits collected by Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
statistics_explained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics) which state that “Among the citizens from 
non-member countries living in the EU-27 in 2012, some 44.2% were citizens of a high HDI country (with 
Turkey, Albania and Russia accounting for almost half of these), while a slightly higher share (48.3%) came 
from medium HDI countries (one-fifth of whom were from Morocco, with citizens of China and Ukraine the next 
largest groups). The remaining 7.6% were from low HDI countries (30% of whom had Nigerian or Iraqi 
citizenship)”. 
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during 2012 (a total of about 1.3 million) than any other country except Russia.2 While 
scenario-building remains more of a crystal-ball exercise rather than a scientifically rigorous 
method, one could well expect that if the economic and political situation continues to 
worsen, migration from Ukraine to the EU may not only continue but may perhaps increase 
(Düvell, 2014). Fortunately, many of the EU member states closest to Ukraine have fairly 
good economic outlooks and allowing some access for Ukrainians to enter the EU for 
economic purposes may be a wise choice in such a context.  
One of the preferred policy tools used by the EU for these purposes has been the so-called 
Mobility Partnerships, which form part of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (GAMM). These partnerships are non-legally binding political declarations that aim 
to facilitate temporary labour immigration to the Union. So far, however, they have largely 
remained centred on EU and member states’ security interests, such as the ‘fight against 
irregular immigration’ through readmission agreements and strengthening border controls 
and surveillance. The EU has concluded a total of seven Mobility Partnerships with the 
following partners: Cape Verde, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Morocco and 
Tunisia. The effectiveness of these partnerships has been called into question, due to the 
limited extent to which they have opened up legal channels of mobility to the Union., 
thereby undermining the credibility of the EU (Carrera, 2011; Carrera, den Hertog and 
Parkin, 2012). The content of each Partnership differs widely depending on the partner 
country. They generally aim to offer incentives to third countries to cooperate with the EU on 
irregular immigration and border controls in exchange for visa facilitation/liberalisation and 
legal channels of economic mobility. 
A Mobility Partnership with Ukraine was in fact discussed during the Hungarian Presidency 
(first half of 2011), but no formal agreement was reached. In addition to a low degree of 
interest shown by some EU member state governments, it appears that the Ukrainian side 
was at that time reluctant to establish legal channels that would allow domestic workers to 
be employed in the EU due to the country’s declining population and labour market 
shortages.3 As the European Commission has recently acknowledged, the critical situation 
currently existing in the country has brought the possibility for a new ‘EU offer’ of a Mobility 
Partnership back on the menu. The difference now is that Ukraine has already signed 
readmission and visa facilitation agreements with the EU, with visa liberalisation and 
economic migration remaining open options. The challenge for the EU here will remain one 
of offering credible and attractive channels for labour mobility between the Union and 
Ukraine while avoiding triggering a ‘brain drain’, which could further weaken the Ukrainian 
economy.  
Three kinds of access for economic purposes could be important to relieve what may be 
temporary but intolerable economic conditions in Ukraine while meeting this concern.  
The first is local trading, which is an important economic activity in the border areas 
between Ukraine and the EU mainly in the form of small trading of goods back and forth 
                                                 
2  Some 6 million Russian nationals, or 40% of total applied for a Schengen visa in 2012 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-
policy/docs/overview_of_schengen_visa_statistics_en.pdf). The number of C Visas applied for by 
Ukrainian nationals follows: 2009: 854,209 / 2010: 972,580 / 2011: 1,142,732 / 2012: 1,313,727 (applied 
for) and 1,283,014 (issued), which included 494,749 multiple entry C visas. The Polish embassy in Lvov 
(Ukraine) received 224,615 applications and issued 219,825 visas and the German embassy in Kiev 
(Ukraine) received 106,294 applications and issued 100,390 visas.  
3  http://www.easternpartnership.org/publication/mobility-and-migration/2011-08-23/assessing-
mobility-partnerships-between-eu-and-moldova  
WHAT ROLE FOR MIGRATION POLICY IN THE UKRAINE CRISIS? | 3 
 
across the border. A local border traffic regime between Ukraine and Poland already allows 
for simplified visa-free border crossing between the two states for social, cultural and 
economic purposes. Poland recommended in 2010 that the local border traffic zone be 
enlarged to cover more of both countries. Now may be a particularly good moment to take 
this step in order to take some of the pressure off persons and small-service provision 
activities at the border on a regulated and flexible basis.  
This is particularly critical as it seems that while the European Council remains committed to 
facilitate people-to-people contacts in the context of the EU Action Plan on Visa 
Liberalisation (VLAP) with Ukraine, there are still a number of outstanding conditions in the 
country identified by the Commission’s Third Report on the Implementation of the VLAP, 
such as anti-corruption, non-discrimination and asylum protection. The current crises may 
be only worsening these conditions and could potentially block EU member states’ green 
light for liberalisation (Hernández i Sagrera). The EU could also encourage member states to 
more effectively implement the EU-Ukraine Visa Facilitation Agreement of 2013, which 
allows, inter alia, the waiving of visa fees for certain categories of visa applicants and more 
flexibility in issuing multiple-entry visas. This should go hand-in-hand with a more uniform 
application of visa requirements by member states’ consular missions abroad to Ukrainian 
applicants, who should not be subject to stricter application rules in comparison to other 
nationalities (Europe without Frontiers, 2012).4 
The second form of economic activity between Ukraine and the EU that needs to be 
accommodated quickly to ameliorate the situation is provision of services. The EU-Ukraine 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 1999, provides for exactly this 
kind of activity. Article 37 of the Agreement requires the progressive liberalisation of 
services provision between the parties and mandates the Association Council to make the 
necessary rules. The EU is free to propose a measure to the Association Council to rapidly 
move forward on this objective of the agreement, perhaps even acting unilaterally in the first 
instance. Under such an arrangement, artisans and tradespersons who want to provide 
services in the EU could do so for a short period of time. The income from providing such 
service could offset some of the more extreme economic consequences of the current 
turbulence. For those tradespersons who make a success of their activities in the EU, the 
possibility of establishment should always be open as well. 
The third economic activity that needs to be accommodated is employment. Again, there are 
provisions5 for Ukrainian companies under the PCA to send their key personnel to the EU to 
set up subsidiaries under conditions as favourable as those applicable to EU companies. For 
Ukrainian businesses, which may be suffering from a downturn in demand in Ukraine at the 
moment, the possibility to establish a subsidiary in an EU member state and to focus on 
extending their markets may be a wise option and a strategy to continue growth 
notwithstanding the unfavourable climate in Ukraine. The EU could promote a full and 
inclusive application of the relevant provisions of the PCA by the member states and 
encourage their authorities to issue the necessary visas and work permits for employees of 
Ukrainian companies to exercise their right to establishment in the EU.  
Good neighbours are those willing to lend a helping hand when times are tough, not those 
who pull up the drawbridge and turn their backs on those less fortunate. In the case of 
Ukraine, the EU needs to keep its borders open for the free movement of people and 
                                                 
4 The study by Europe without Frontiers has identified the existence of different Schengen visa 
standards and practices in EU member states’ consulates but also more stringent requirements in 
countries such as Italy, the UK and the Czech Republic.  
5 Article 30 of the Agreement. 
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facilitate mobility back and forth between Ukraine and the EU for economic purposes to 
alleviate the hardship that is likely to come. The EU cannot be seen – as was the case three 
years ago during the Arab Spring – to support peoples struggling for change only on the 
condition that they stay where they are. One of the key features that must be taken into 
account in determining any future policy approach by the EU is the strength of solidarity 
that EU member states feel towards their neighbours. 
 
